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Abstract 
The electricity generation in Switzerland is mainly based on hydropower (55% of 
total production). The exploitation of water in the hydropower sector can generate 
significant so-called resource rents. These are defined by the surplus return above the 
value of capital, labor, materials and energy used to exploit hydropower.  
In Switzerland, hydropower producers pay to the State a fixed fee per kW gross 
capacity. With this system the substantial differences in costs, revenues and in the 
production characteristics of the hydropower plants are not taken into account. 
In this context, the following paper has two main goals: 1) To discuss the 
introduction in the Swiss hydropower sector of a new payment system based on a 
resource rent tax; 2) To propose a combination of a RRT system with a benchmarking 
analysis of the production cost obtained through the estimation of a stochastic 
frontier variable cost function.  
We estimate a true random effects stochastic frontier variable cost function 
using panel data in order to overcome the asymmetric information problem. In 
addition, using the information on cost efficiency of the single companies, we show 
how to introduce in the RRT scheme a benchmark system which gives incentives to 
minimize the production costs.  
Keywords: Resource Rent Taxation; Hydropower; Efficiency 
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1 Introduction 
In Switzerland, electricity is mainly produced by hydropower companies, 
which employ labor, capital and waterpower.1 The exploitation of this important 
natural resource can generate significant economic rents (“resource rents”) given by 
the surplus return above the value of the capital, labor, materials and other inputs 
employed to exploit the resource (Rothman, 2000).   
The right to utilize the waterpower is granted to the Swiss hydropower 
companies by the cantonal governments. Of course, the cantonal governments seek 
compensation for the rights granted to use waterpower. The reason to demand 
payment is that there is an economic value involved in the use of hydropower. For 
some Alpine cantons the revenues from water fees and taxation of hydropower 
companies account for more than 10% (up to 20%) of overall revenues. These water 
fees are even more important for certain municipalities with a share of more than 
50% of overall revenues. Therefore, a reform of the water fee system has important 
political and economic implications and requires a careful implementation (Banfi et 
al., 2004). 
Today, the Swiss hydropower producers pay a fixed fee per kW gross capacity of 
the plants, irrespective of their cost structure or revenue possibilities. The fee amounts 
to as much as 20%-30% (including direct taxes2) of the total production costs of 
hydropower producers.  
From the economic point of view, the current payment method is not 
satisfactory, because it does not reflect the value of the resource rent which varies 
considerably among the companies.3 Indeed, this is the case because of the very 
                                                             
1 The Swiss electricity sector is mainly based on hydropower generation (~55%) and on 
nuclear power generation (~40%). The production of electric power using thermal power 
plants or using wind or photovoltaic energy is currently limited (~5%). The run-of-river hydro 
power plants and the nuclear power plants are utilized principally to meet the demand for 
electricity at a national level during the medium and low load periods, whereas the storage and 
the pump storage power plants are employed to satisfy the electricity demand during the high 
load periods. The cantonal governments own the majority of these hydropower companies 
directly or indirectly (through some of the overland companies). 
 
2 Which are the minor part of the total tax burden. 
3 See Banfi et al. (2005) for a first assessment of the magnitude of economic rent in the Swiss 
hydropower sector. 
 3 
heterogeneous cost structure, due, for example, to the different locations of the 
plants, and revenue possibilities, resulting, for instance, from different shares of peak 
load electricity produced by run-of-river and storage plants. Therefore, for some 
hydropower producers the amount of this rent can be lower or higher than the fixed 
fee they have to pay with the current system. Of course, until now the hydropower 
plants with a lower resource rent per kWh than the fixed fee were able to increase the 
final consumer price because they were operating in a monopoly situation. However, 
with the ongoing stepwise market liberalization of the Swiss electricity market, which 
started in January 2009 with the free choice of electricity supplier for large consumers 
(above 100’000 kWh per year) this possibility will be excluded.  
From the economic point of view a resource rent tax (RRT) would be a 
satisfactory payment system for three main reasons4.  
 First, it is connected directly to the economic value of the resource and 
thus enhances allocative efficiency.  
 Second, it is - compared to other rent extraction schemes - neutral to 
investment decisions since marginal firms are not taxed, and thus the 
competitiveness of the industry is secured5. In the long run the current 
inflexible water fee system could make some hydropower companies 
unprofitable. Given complete market liberalization, some hydropower 
producers are likely to refuse to renovate their plants in case the 
production costs (including water fees) can no longer be covered by the 
expected market prices. By contrast, if the water fees were based on the 
value of the resource rent, these companies - or at least part of them - 
would decide to renovate their plants, as long as total costs can be 
covered by the expected market prices6. Thus, in order to guarantee the 
long-term competitiveness of Swiss hydropower companies, it would be 
important to introduce a resource rent tax system.7 
                                                             
4 See Copithorne et al. (1985) and Watkins (2001) for a presentation and discussion of the RRT 
and other taxation systems or Amundsen et al. (1992) for a discussion of the application of 
these instruments in the (Norwegian) hydropower sector.  
5 For a first analysis of the competitiveness of the Swiss hydropower sector in a liberalized 
market see Banfi et al. (2002).  
6 For an empirical analysis of the impact of a RRT on the decision to renovate the production 
plants see Banfi et al. (2004). 
7 The current discussion about a more flexible water fees system is particularly important since 
in few years several licenses for the use of hydropower by the companies will expire. With the 
renewal of licenses much more restrictive constraints for the low flow have to be realized, 
which will have important impacts on the production and therefore on the revenues of firms. 
This may additionally weaken the competitive position of some hydropower plants. 
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 Third, a change in the water fee system shouldn’t affect electricity prices. 
The main reason is that a flexible water fee system is comparable to a 
tax on profits which leaves the production costs unchanged.8  
In spite of the economic advantages, the change from a fixed fee system to an 
RRT is politically controversial as water fees are an important source of revenue for the 
cantonal governments and a change in the payment system would entail considerable 
regional financial effects. 
A resource rent tax is an interesting water fee system. However, this system has 
a drawback, it does not include strong incentives to operate efficiently, e.g. at the 
minimum cost. This incentive is particularly low if the tax rate is 100% of the RR. Also 
with a tax rate lower than 100% this incentive remains weak. This means that a 
company does not have incentives to reduce cost because it cannot internalize the 
benefit of the effort.  
In order to introduce incentives to improve the cost efficiency of the companies 
the state could adopt the following strategies:  
1. Introduce a RRT rate lower than 100%. In this case the benefit of an 
improvement of the level of the cost efficiency would be shared 
between the company and the state.  
2. Combine a RRT system with a benchmarking analysis of the cost of 
the hydropower companies. Firms characterized by cost inefficiency 
would be punished in the computation of RRT.  
3. A combination of points 1) and 2).  
This paper has two main goals:  
1. To discuss the introduction in the Swiss hydropower sector of a new 
payment system based on a resource rent tax;  
2. To propose a combination of a RRT system with a benchmarking analysis 
of the production cost obtained through the estimation of a stochastic 
frontier variable cost function.  
The basic idea of this paper is to recommend the integration of the results of an 
econometric frontier variable cost function in an RRT system. This integration can 
                                                             
8 Moreover, Swiss electricity producers are well integrated in the European electricity market. 
The reference prices are mainly determined on the European electricity market EEX. Given their 
small production share at the European level, Swiss hydropower plants have to be considered 
price-takers.  
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reduce the asymmetric information problem about production costs the government 
faces when assessing the RRT and increase costs efficiency of companies.9 
This paper is structured as follows: In section 2 we will introduce the concept of 
resource rent, give an outline of the different rent extraction schemes and illustrate 
the problems arising with a fixed water fee system. Based on these concepts, we will 
propose a new rent extraction scheme for the Swiss hydropower sector. In section 3 
we will specify the stochastic frontier variable cost function used for the empirical part 
of the analysis. In section 4 we illustrate the characteristics of the database and 
present and discuss the empirical results. Finally, in section 5 we will complete the 
paper with the main conclusions and policy implications. 
2 A resource rent tax for the Swiss hydropower sector 
As previously explained, from an economic point of view the price for the use of 
a resource should be connected to the concept of economic rent or, using the term 
applied to natural resources, to the resource rent.   
Resource rent can be divided mainly into two different kinds: differential and 
scarcity rent. Differential rent arises because of (innate) differences of production 
sites, as described before, whereas scarcity rent emanates from the restricted supply 
of the good, due to natural or political circumstances. Both kinds of rent arise from the 
characteristics of the natural resource and their sum is therefore called “resource 
rent”.10 One has to note, however, that other authors (Amundsen et al., 1992; 
Amundsen and Tjotta, 1993; Amundsen, 1997; Bernard, 1982; Gillen and Wen, 2000) 
define resource rent as scarcity rent only and use the term “hydro rent” to describe 
economic rent arising from hydropower production. Nevertheless, Amundsen (1997) 
and Amundsen and Tjotta (1993) remark: „It is interesting to note, however, that hydro 
                                                             
9 Of course, we are aware that the estimation of the level of the resource rent needs also 
information on the revenues of the companies. This information can be taken from the annual 
reports (ex post) or can be forecasted (ex ante or ex post estimation of the revenues). This 
paper focuses on the combination of the RRT with the estimation of a cost frontier function 
and will not develop further the discussion of the estimation of the revenues. Of course, also in 
this case a RRT system with a tax rate of 100% does not give incentives to the companies to 
maximize the revenues. A possibility to solve this problem could be to use an econometric 
model to estimate the maximal revenues. This analysis is, however, beyond the goal of this 
paper.  
10 See van Kooten and Bulte (2000) for a discussion. 
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rent also possesses one of the characteristics of resource rent since water contained as 
storage in a dam is seasonally scarce and, thus is regulated according to its „water 
value“, i.e. a positive marginal user cost which is normally associated with resource 
rent“. 
Generally, a resource rent is a surplus value, i.e., the difference between the price 
and the average production costs of a good. In Ricardo’s (1817) classical example, 
resource rent accrues due to the different productivity levels of different agricultural 
production sites. A site with less favorable characteristics will – ceteris paribus - face 
higher production costs, and thus make lower profits (in the case of a free market with 
exogenously given prices). The marginal firm will only be able to cover its production 
costs and not receive any resource rent. Similarly, in the hydropower sector it can be 
observed that some producers face ideal conditions to construct and operate a plant, 
whereas other firms have to build their plants in locations with more difficult site 
characteristics, and thus have higher investment and operation costs for a given 
output. The producers of these plants earn a lower resource rent in comparison with 
other plants operating in more favorable environmental conditions. In a competitive 
market, the resource rent reflects the “true economic value” of the natural resource 
exploited.  
In a competitive electricity market, the concept of resource rent can be 
illustrated graphically using the demand and supply curves. 
Figure 1 shows the production situation of four different companies that operate 
in different regions with constant returns to scale. Firms U1 , U2 , U3 and U4 differ only 
in the average production costs. The equilibrium price is determined by the 
intersection of the aggregate demand and supply curves.  
Figure 1: Different producers and resource rent (marginal costs=average costs) 
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In Figure 1 producer U4 is the marginal producer in this setting, and thus just 
covers his average/marginal costs at market price pm. Any other producer showing 
higher production costs will thus not be able to cover his costs at this price and 
therefore not participate in the market. Producers U1, U2, and U3 do earn a resource 
rent in this situation, since their production costs are lower than the effective market 
price. These rents indicated by R1 to R3 identify the difference between the effective 
market price (pm=c4) and the respective production costs.11 
The current payment method for the use of hydropower applied in Switzerland 
is a fixed fee per kW gross capacity and, therefore, is not based on the resource rent 
concept. Hence, an alternative pricing scheme should be considered in order to 
promote the efficiency and competitiveness of this sector. 
There are a variety of rent extraction mechanisms, an overview and evaluation 
of these different approaches is given by Watkins (2001), for example. In the following 
we will concentrate on the so-called resource rent tax (RRT), first put forward by 
Garnaut and Clunies Ross (1975), which is the concept we propose in order to fix the 
price hydropower producers have to pay to the owner of the resource (the 
government). A resource pricing based on the RRT is, from an economic point of view, 
the best pricing scheme, because it is connected directly to the economic value of the 
resource. Therefore, the RRT can strengthen the competitiveness of the companies in a 
liberalized market (protecting marginal producers). Furthermore, it is neutral to 
investments and flexible in a changing economic environment12. In addition, it gives 
the possibility to introduce incentives for improvements in cost efficiency, as will be 
illustrated in this paper.  
There are two main approaches to the implementation of a RRT in the 
hydropower sector: 
1. A cash-flow based approach, which addresses the hydropower project as a 
whole and applies when the accumulated revenues exceed accumulated 
costs (taking into account the respective interest rate). In this system, an 
“immediate” depreciation takes place and thus the tax is paid only after 
several years of operation of the hydropower plant.  
                                                             
11 Of course, it could also be possible to present a situation with two types of electricity 
demand: peak and off-peak demand. In such a situation, the economic rent of firms U1, U2, U3, 
and U4 would vary with time.  
12 See Watkins (2001) or Banfi et al. (2004) for a more detailed comparison of the different 
taxation approaches using the relevant appraisal criteria.   
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2. A RRT based on profits, which is very similar to a profit tax but includes an 
annual depreciation plus deductible cost of capital in the calculation of the 
resource rent.  
The cash-flow based approach could be implemented for new power plants and 
would, especially in a deregulated market, lower the risk of such long-term 
investments. In fact, the companies pay a resource rent tax only if positive net returns 
are gained. However, in a situation where the power plants are already running, the 
second approach would be more appropriate, since, otherwise, one would have to get 
information on past investments, expenditures and amortizations. In most situations 
this might not be feasible.  
Since we are interested in the introduction of a RRT for the current Swiss 
hydropower companies, and considering that in the coming years just few new 
hydropower plants will be constructed (if at all), we decided to adopt the second 
approach for our estimations.  
When implementing an RRT, it is, first of all, necessary that the local authority 
has access to the information on costs and revenues of the hydropower producers. The 
accurate auditing of the cost elements of a firm is important for the estimation of the 
RR. For this reason, the authority should define some guidelines concerning the 
accounting and reporting systems of hydropower producers. Special attention should 
be put on 1) guidelines to estimate the net book value of the company’s capital assets 
used specifically for the production of electricity, 2) guidelines for depreciation and 3) 
definition of a reasonable rate of return. 13 
It must be pointed out that the only difference between the quantitative 
definition of the RR and the company profit14 lies in the different assessments of the 
capital cost components (the costs of equity capital are not considered in the 
calculation of the profits). A further difference could be given by the level of the 
variable costs used for the computation of the RR (for instance by introducing a 
benchmarking analysis considering the cost inefficiency of the companies).  
In order to calculate the RRT, the government could use two approaches. In the 
first approach the government could directly use the information on total costs and 
total revenues presented in the annual reports of the hydropower companies. As 
                                                             
13 The definition of the rate of return of debt capital raises usually less problems since there 
exist market respectively book values for it. For equity capital this rate of return should 
consider a fair risk premium.  
14 Besides the conceptual ones, like understanding the rent as the value of the resource, etc. 
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already discussed, the main problems of this method in the Swiss hydropower sector 
are:  
a) Most of the hydropower companies are so-called partner companies, 
which supply electricity to their owners, who bear the production 
costs.15 Other producers have long-term contracts with prices that are 
not disclosed to the public. As a consequence, the revenues reported by 
the partner companies nowadays do not reflect the market prices and 
accordingly the scarcity of the resource. This market structure is a 
characteristic of the Swiss electricity sector. Although we are aware that 
a prediction of revenues would be important in order to estimate the 
RRT, in this paper the focus is on the estimation of the cost inefficiency. 
b) Companies might have an incentive problem to produce at a cost 
minimizing level because the benefits of a cost reduction are captured 
by the local government through a RRT with a levy rate of 100%. But 
also with a levy below 100% companies may not have enough 
incentives to produce at a cost minimizing point. This cost inefficiency 
in the hydropower production could reduce the amount of the resource 
rent to be collected by the government.  
To solve the cost inefficiency problem, in this paper we propose to estimate for 
each hydropower plant a cost inefficiency indicator based on the estimation of a 
frontier variable cost function that should be considered in the computation of the 
RRT. An estimation of total costs (including capital costs) would make less sense, since, 
due to the long-term time horizon of the investments (50-80 years), the capital costs 
of existing plants can be considered fixed16.  
Taking this discussion into account, we arrive at a general formula for the 
computation of the resource rent (RR) and of the resource rent tax (RRT), respectively, 
that can be applied for the Swiss hydropower market.  
RRit = TRit-DCCit-(VCit*(1- CINit)) (1) 
where TRit are the total revenues for company i in year t, DCCit is the deductible capital 
cost, VCit are the observed variable cost and CINit is the level of cost inefficiency of the 
                                                             
15 In Switzerland approximately 80 hydropower and 5 nuclear power companies primarily 
organized as partner companies (“Partnerwerke”) are involved in the generation. It is important 
to note that in a partner company a shareholder has the right to claim a share of the electricity 
produced in accordance with the amount of their share capital.  
16 It is therefore not possible for the firms to change these investments. We are aware that 
these costs may not reflect an efficient investment policy of the companies. As a mean of 
minimal monitoring, one could limit the allowed capital costs at an upper limit for the rate-of 
return (including a risk premium) and control for special depreciation. 
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company. In this formula, the observed variable cost is corrected for the level of cost 
inefficiency of the company.17 
The RRT will then be calculated with the following expression: 
RRTit= % * (RRit)     (2) 
The percentage of the RRT will be fixed by the local government. This 
mechanism introduces a clear incentive for the hydropower company to minimize the 
cost. For instance, if a company already produces at the minimum of variable costs 
then CINit is 0 and the computation of the RRT takes into account the VCit  obtained 
from the accounting information system of the company. If the firm shows a cost 
inefficiency level (CIN) of 20% (the variable cost is 20% higher then the minimum 
variable cost), then the observed cost will be reduced by 20%. This implies an increase 
of the RR and, therefore, an increase of the RRT. Of course, if the levy is lower than 
100%, then a further mechanism that gives incentives to the company to minimize the 
variable cost is present. In fact, a reduction of the variable cost will increase the RR, but 
only a fraction of it will be capture by the RRT. Part of this reduction can be kept by the 
company.  
3 Specification of the frontier variable cost function for 
the hydropower plants 
A frontier variable cost function identifies the minimum costs at a given 
output level, input price, capital stock and existing production technology. It is unlikely 
that all firms will operate at the frontier. Failure to attain the cost frontier implies the 
existence of technical and allocative inefficiency. In this paper we consider the 
estimation of a stochastic frontier variable cost function using panel data.18 In order to 
estimate this frontier, it is necessary to specify a model and choose a functional form 
and an econometric approach. 
The main costs of operating a hydropower company comprise the costs of 
building and maintaining the dam, the steel lined pressure shaft, the power house and 
the turbines. Moreover, these costs may depend upon the size of the reservoir, the 
type of the hydropower plant (storage or run-of-river) as well as the number of plants 
operated by a single company. In fact, the Swiss hydropower companies partly operate 
several plants located in the same region. Therefore, an analysis of the cost structure 
                                                             
17 Of course, we are aware that the measurement of inefficiency is not so straightforward. For a 
practical implementation of this system it is recommended to use in the estimation of cost 
efficiency several models and adopt the consistency approach suggested by Bauer et al. (1998).  
18 Different approaches can be used to estimate a frontier cost function. A good overview is 
given by Battese (1992) and Kumbhakar and Knox Lovell (2000). 
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of these companies should take account of the fact that the same quantities of 
electricity can be produced using several plants and/or different types of plants 
(storage, pump-storage and run-of-river). In the cost model specification it is therefore 
important to introduce some variables related to both the type of the power plants 
employed in the production and the organization of the companies.  
In the cost model of the hydropower plants we consider one single output. 
Inputs consist primarily of labor, material and capital.19  
Assuming that output and input prices are exogenous, and that (for a given 
technology) firms adjust input levels so as to minimize costs, the firm's total cost of 
operating an hydropower company can be represented by the cost function 
),,,,,,,,( 21 TDDDDCPNQVVC PSSRRL  (3) 
where VC represents variable cost, Q is the output represented by the total 
number of GWh produced and N is the number of plants. PL is the price of labour and 
and C stands for the capital stock described as the book value of the companies. 
Unfortunately, we could not consider the price of material in the model specification 
(3) due to lack of data.20  
Finally, we introduced 4 dummy variables ( ),,, 21 PSSRR DDDD  in the model to 
control for differences in cost among different types of hydropower plants used by the 
companies: run-of-river with an exploitable drop above 25 m, run-of-river with an 
exploitable drop below 25 m storage and pump-storage plants. T, the time trend, is 
included as a way of capturing the effects of neutral technical change. 
The properties of cost function (3) are that it is concave and linearly 
homogeneous in input prices, non-decreasing in input prices and output, and, 
regarding capital stock, non-increasing21. 
To estimate the cost function (3), a translog functional form is employed. This 
flexible functional form is a local, second-order approximation to an arbitrary cost 
function. It places no a priori restrictions on the elasticities of substitution and allows 
                                                             
19 The cost model specification used in this paper reflects the model used by Filippini and 
Luchsinger (2007). These two authors estimated a variable cost function to obtain information 
on the economies of scale. In the present study we estimate a frontier variable cost function in 
order to get information on the cost efficiency level of the companies. This is the main 
difference between the two studies.  
20 The effect of this input price on cost is considered in the constant.  
21 See Cornes (1992), p. 106.  
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the economies of scale estimate to vary with the output level.22 The translog 
approximation to (3) is 
vituitDDD,D)C)(lnP(ln)C)(lnN(ln
)P)(lnN(ln)C)(lnQ(ln)P)(lnQ(ln)N)(lnQ(ln)C(ln
2
1
)P(ln
2
1)N(ln
2
1)Q(ln
2
1ClnPlnNlnQln)VCln(
TTPSPSSS1R1RLPLCNC
LNPLQCLQPLQN
2
CC
2
LPLPL
2
NN
2
QQCLPLNQ0






 (4) 
In this specification, which reflects the standard stochastic frontier approach 
proposed by Aigner et al. (1977)23, the error term is composed of two parts: the first, uit 
is a one-sided non-negative disturbance reflecting the effect of costs; the second, vit is 
a two-sided disturbance capturing the effect of noise. The standard random error term 
vit  is assumed to be distributed independent of uit as i.i.d N(0, v ), whereas for the 
non-negative cost inefficiency term uit, we assume a half-normal distribution N+(0,u).  
Of course, we are aware, that in the model specification (3) some environmental 
and firm characteristics that influence the cost of the hydropower plants are missing. 
This unobserved firm specific heterogeneity could, of course, influence the 
econometric results and, therefore, also the cost inefficiency indicators. However, the 
literature on the estimation of frontier cost function using panel data has recently 
proposed some approaches that try to overcome this unobserved heterogeneity 
problem. 
The first use of panel data models in stochastic frontier models goes back to Pitt 
and Lee (1981) who interpreted the panel data random effects (RE) as inefficiency 
rather than heterogeneity. Pitt and Lee (1981)’s model is different from the 
conventional RE model in that the individual specific effects are assumed to follow a 
half-normal distribution.24 A major shortcoming of these models is that any 
unobserved, time-invariant, firm-specific heterogeneity is considered as inefficiency. In 
order to solve this problem using panel data, Greene (2005) proposed to extend the 
stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) model in its original form (Aigner et. al. 1977) by 
adding a fixed or random individual effect in the model and/or by allowing some 
coefficients to be random.25 The main model used in this paper is the true random 
                                                             
22 A translog function requires the approximation of the underlying cost function to be made at 
a local point, which in our case is taken at the median point of all variables. Thus, all 
independent variables are normalized at their median point. 
23 For estimation purposes, the negative sign on the dependent variable can be ignored. This 
results in the signs of the estimated coefficient being reversed. 
24 Schmidt and Sickles (1984) and Battese and Coelli (1992) presented variations of this model. 
25 For a successful application of these models in network industries see Farsi et al. (2005) and 
Farsi et al. (2006). 
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effects (TRE) stochastic frontier model proposed Greene (2005).26 In this model, that 
allows distinguishing heterogeneities such as external environmental effects from 
cost efficiency, the intercept (i) is assumed to be a random variable. The translog 
specification of the TRE stochastic frontier variable cost function is: 
vituitDDD,D)C)(lnP(ln)C)(lnN(ln
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   (5) 
This model treats therefore firm-specific random effects (i) and time-
varying inefficiency (uit) separately and is therefore able to distinguish between the 
unobserved heterogeneity and inefficiency. In this way it tries to overcome some 
limitations of the conventional panel data models. 
4 Data and empirical results 
The model is estimated with panel data from a sample of Swiss hydropower 
companies. Our study is principally based on a database created by using different 
sources: the Swiss Federal Statistical Office's value added statistics (”Wertschöpfungs-
statistik”), the Swiss Federal Energy Office's financial statistics (“Finanzstatistik”) and a 
database created by the Centre of Energy Policy and Economics by collecting annual 
financial and economic reports of the companies. Additional technical information 
was taken from a database on this sector built up by the Federal Office for Water and 
Geology. 
After this information was collected and the data sets were merged, the final 
data set consisted of a sample of 60 hydropower companies. However, some of these 
had to be excluded from the econometric analysis due to missing data. Model (5) has 
been estimated using an unbalanced panel data set, which includes 43 companies 
observed over a period that varies from 2 to 7 years (with a total of 263 observations).  
The total variable cost per year is equated to the sum of labor, operational 
(including material) and energy costs. Average annual wage rates are estimated by 
dividing the labor expenditure by the number of employees. Unfortunately, no 
information is available to define a price for the use of materials. The capital stock is 
defined as the book value as reported in the annual financial reports of the 
                                                             
26 Although similar extensions have been proposed by several previous authors, Greene (2005) 
provides effective numerical solutions. For similar models see in particular Kumbhakar (1991) 
and Polachek and Yoon (1996). 
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companies.27  All input prices, total costs and variable costs were deflated to 1996 
constant Swiss francs using the Consumer Price Index. Descriptive statistics of the 
variables included in the model are presented in Table 1. 
Table 1:  Descriptive statistics of variables included in the model 
Variable Description 1. Quartile  Median 3. Quartile 
Q Gwh 223.6 428.6 855.5 
N number 1 3 4 
PL CHF per months 97’250 106’500 116’700 
C Book value in CHF 59’700’000 145’000’000 361’500’000 
 
The composition of the hydropower plants included in the sample is the 
following: 37% are pump-storage plants, 27% storage plants, 15% run-of-river with an 
exploitable drop below 25 m and 21% run-of-river plants with an exploitable drop 
above 25 m.  
The estimated coefficients and their t-values of the cost model (5) estimated 
using the TRE stochastic frontier model are presented in table 2. The estimated 
function is well behaved. Most of the parameter estimates are statistically significant. 
A well-defined variable cost function should be increasing with respect to 
output and input prices, concave with respect to input prices and non-increasing with 
respect to capital stock. 
Since total cost and the regressors are in logarithms and have been normalized, 
the coefficients are interpretable as cost elasticities. All these coefficients show the 
expected signs and are highly significant.  
The output elasticity is positive and implies that an increase in the production 
will raise the variable/total cost. A 1% increase in the quantity of electricity produced 
will increase the variable cost by approximately 0.45%. This result implies that the 
Swiss hydropower plants are characterized by economies of utilization.28 
                                                             
27 No data were available which would allow the calculation of the capital stock using the 
perpetual inventory method. 
28 Caves and Christensen (1988) define a measure of utilization economies as unity divided by a 
proportional increase in variable cost resulting from a proportional increase in output holding 
the capital stock constant. Thus, economies of utilization represent variable cost changes when 
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The labor cost elasticity is positive, implying that the cost function is increasing 
in this input factor. The cost elasticity with respect to the number of plants is positive 
and indicates that an increase in the production units will raise variable cost of a 
hydropower company by about 22%. 
The coefficient of capital stock is not significantly different from zero. This result 
indicates that the regularity condition of non-increasing variable cost with respect to 
the capital stock is satisfied at the median of the data.29  
                                                                                                                                                                            
output is increased with capacity constant. According to this definition, we define economies 
of utilization (EUVC) as y
VCEUVC
ln
ln
1


.  
We talk of economies of utilization if EUVC is greater than 1 and, accordingly, identify 
diseconomies of utilization if EUVC is below 1. In the case of EUVC = 1, no economies or 
diseconomies of utilization are existing. 
29 For a detailed discussion on this point see Filippini (1996). 
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Table 2: Estimation results of the Cobb-Douglas cost function 
 TRE 
 Coefficients t-Values 
LnQ 0.447 17.366*** 
LnPL 0.365 4.233*** 
LnC 0.023 1.336   
LnN 0.225 7.336*** 
LnQQ -0.120  -4.068*** 
LnPLPL 1.064 1.654 
LnCC 0.000 0.013 
LnNN 0.615 8.231*** 
LnQPL -0.291 -2.522** 
LnQC 0.059 4.237*** 
LnQN -0.034 -1.010 
LnPLC -0.021 -.254 
LnPLN 0.193 1.260 
LnCN -0.183 -7.598*** 
DR1 0.161 3.811***    
DS 0.399 9.274***  
DPS 0.845 17.349*** 
Time -0.025 -7.230*** 
Constant 15.052 323.353*** 
Lambda 2.804 4.346*** 
* significant at .1, ** significant at .05, and *** significant at .01  
 
The dummy variables for the technology of hydropower plants, namely DR1 (run-
of-river with an exploitable drop above 25 m), DSP (storage pump plant) and DS (storage 
plant) - have a significant positive coefficient. This result implies that storage 
hydropower plants and run-of-river plants situated in the mountains (therefore with a 
higher exploitable drop) show higher variable costs, because they are more complex 
and difficult to operate, than run-of-river hydropower plants located along the large 
rivers.30 Finally, turning to the question of technological progress, table 2 indicates that 
there is evidence of a small negative time shift of the variable cost function. Thus, the 
                                                             
30  The variable DR2 does not appear in the table because it is taken as reference, in order to 
avoid the dummy variable trap. 
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negative coefficient of T indicates that the Swiss hydropower companies underwent 
progressive technical change during the period considered in the analysis.  
Table 3 gives the summary statistics of the inefficiency scores resulted from the 
TRE model. The inefficiency score is defined as exp(uit), where uit is the inefficiency 
term obtained from the econometric model. The scores therefore represent the ratio 
of a company’s actual variable costs to a minimum level that would have been 
achieved had the company operated as cost-efficient as the ‘best practice’ observed in 
the sample. These results indicate the presence of cost inefficiency in the hydropower 
sector. 
Table 3: Summary statistics of inefficiency scores 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Median 
Cost inefficiency 0.027 0.81 0.187 0.152 
 
Table 3 illustrate that in the mean, companies exhibit variable costs which are 
around 19% higher than the minimal level which could be reached. The most cost 
efficient company has variable costs approaching the minimum estimated by the cost 
function (just 2.7% higher). On the other side, the variable cost of the least efficient 
company is 80% higher than the minimum cost estimated.  
As discussed in section 2, the cost efficiency indicators can be used by the 
government to calculate the individual RRT. This approach would reduce the problem 
of asymmetric information of the government and improve the productive efficiency 
of the sector.  
5 Conclusions 
Natural resource extraction can generate an economic rent, i.e. a surplus profit 
due to a difference between the price at which the resource can be sold and its 
extraction costs. This so-called resource rent should be the basis for fixing the price for 
the use of the resource.  
In contrast to this optimal rent extraction scheme, the water fee currently paid 
by Swiss hydropower producers is basically a fixed amount to be paid per kW gross 
capacity. This fee doesn’t consider the different cost structure and revenue 
possibilities of the companies. Since the water fee is not connected to the economic 
value of the resource it does not enhance allocative efficiency. In addition, the fee 
system is not neutral to investment decision.  
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A resource rent would be an interesting alternative to the current water fee 
system. However, also this system has a drawback since it doesn’t include incentives 
to operate efficiently. In particular, companies might have an incentive problem to 
produce at a cost minimizing level because the benefits of a cost reduction are 
captured by the local government through a RRT with a levy rate of 100%. But also 
with a levy below 100% companies may not have enough incentives to produce at a 
cost minimizing point.  
To solve the cost inefficiency problem, we propose a new water fee scheme 
which combines the resource rent tax system with a benchmarking analysis of the 
production costs of hydropower companies. In this paper, the inefficiency scores used 
for the computation of the RRT have been estimated using panel data and a TRE 
stochastic frontier variable costs function. This econometric approach is able to take 
into account the problem of unobserved heterogeneity.  
The paper shows that the econometric estimation of a TRE frontier variable 
costs function is a feasible and attractive approach. The first results confirm the 
presence of cost inefficiency which should be considered when computing the RRT. 
Such a new RRT scheme would improve efficiency and guarantee the long term 
competitiveness of Swiss hydropower companies. This first analysis shows that there 
is room for a constructive and innovative change in the method of payment of fees for 
the use of waterpower.  
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